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WRONGLY AFFIRMED WITHOUT OPINION
Dennis Crouch*
INTRODUCTION
In his 1909 treatise on appellate jurisdiction, the future Justice
Benjamin Cardozo explained the role of appellate courts-not simply
"declaring justice between man and man, but . .. settling the law."'
In Justice Cardozo's view, the appellate courts exist "not for the
individual litigant, but for the indefinite body of litigants, whose
causes are potentially involved in the specific cause at issue."2
Justice Cardozo's vision more than a century ago still resonates, and
precedential opinions form a mainstay of appellate court activity
nationwide. 3
However, one court of appeals is quite different from the rest.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issues a substantial
number of Rule 36 affirmances without any opinion at all. 4 In fact,
most of the court's Patent Office merits decisions are released as so-
called judicial orders as permitted by the court's local rule for
"judgment of affirmance without opinion."5 Although frustrating for
parties and court watchers, the approach likely provides substantial
short-term efficiency gains for a court that has seen a sharp rise in
the number of appeals following a set of dramatic statutory revisions
and Supreme Court holdings. 6
* Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri School of Law
and Co-Director of the Center for Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship.
Professor Crouch is the primary author of Patently-O, the nation's leading
patent law blog.
1. Philip Marcus, Affirmance Without Opinion, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 212,
227 (1937) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS § 6 (2d ed. 1909)).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 226-27.
4. FED. CIR. R. 36.
5. Id. See, e.g., Int'l Controls & Measurement Corp. v. Honeywell Int'l
Inc., No. 2015-1724, 2016 WL 945294 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 14, 2016) (involving a Rule
36 judgment without opinion).
6. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 212 (describing "affirmance without
opinion" as "a phenomenon which at one time or another is an unwelcome
visitor in almost every law office").
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The Federal Circuit has repeatedly made clear that its Rule 36
judgments are not opinions,7 that they offer no reasons for
judgment,8 and that they should not be read as accepting any of the
reasoning or findings of the lower court.9 Although many have
complained about the no-opinion judgments,10 no one has yet
suggested that the practice violates federal statutory law.
In this Article, I make the novel argument that the appellate
court's steady practice of no-opinion judgments runs contrary to the
law. Both the Patent Act and the Lanham Act require the Federal
Circuit to provide an opinion when issuing a judgment on an appeal
from the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO").11 In particular, both
statutes indicate that, upon determination of the case, the Federal
Circuit "shall issue . . . its mandate and opinion." 12 Quite simply,
Rule 36 judgments are not opinions and do not satisfy the opinion
requirement.
As Justice Cardozo explained, appellate tradition favors
explanatory opinions. 13 In addition, the well-known public-notice
concerns associated with patent and trademark rights help justify
the statutory requirement that opinions be written and included
within the publicly available patent or trademark application file
history.14 This approach is also consistent with the agency law
mandate that requires full explanatory written judgments both by
examiners and the administrative trial boards-the Patent Trial &
7. See, e.g., Rates Tech., Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc., 688 F.3d 742, 750
(Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Since there is no opinion, a Rule 36 judgment simply confirms
that the trial court entered the correct judgment.").
8. See, e.g., id. ("[The judgment] does not endorse or reject any specific
part of the trail court's reasoning.").
9. See, e.g., id. ("In addition, a judgment entered under Rule 36 has no
precedential value and cannot establish 'applicable Federal Circuit law."').
Federal Circuit Rule 36 identifies the process as offering a judgment without
opinion. FED. CIR. R. 36.
10. See Gene Quinn, Rule 36 Judgment. The Growing Problem of One Word
Affirmance by the Federal Circuit, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 22, 2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/08/22/rule-36-judgment/id=72108/.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2012).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4); 35 U.S.C. § 144.
13. See Marcus, supra note 1 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, JURISDICTION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS § 6 (2d ed. 1909)).
14. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 727, 732 (2002) (explaining, inter alia, the prosecution history
documents as important public notice elements); Jacob S. Sherkow,
Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 255-56 (2015)
(discussing the "public nature of most patent disputes"); Karen Millane
Whitney, Sources of Patent Prosecution History Must Not Violate Public Notice
Requirement, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 266, 295 (2001) ("Public notice is of
paramount importance for providing certainty and predictability as to the scope
of patent protection.").
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Appeal Board ("PTAB") and the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board
("TTAB").15
The gap in appellate practice has become critical with the
advent and popularity of post-issuance patent review proceedings
(termed "AIA trials"). 16 In addition to their large numbers and the
higher probability of appeal when compared to traditional ex parte
proceedings,17 PTO decisions regarding America Invents Act ("AIA")
trials are more likely to be nuanced and directly tied to pending
infringement litigation.18 However, in 2015 and 2016, the Federal
Circuit released hundreds of no-opinion judgments in these very
cases. 19
After an introductory historical section, this Article inches
through the construction of the statutory provision-asking whether
the statutes actually require the court to issue opinions and whether
the Federal Circuit's Rule 36 judgment orders should be deemed
opinions under the statute. In addition to the plain language
analysis, I look to the legislative history, policy goals, and
comparative provisions in the U.S. Code and Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Finally, the Article offers a "what next" scenario for the
court and parties.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE APPELLATE PROCESS FOR
CASES STEMMING FROM THE PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE
In general, decisions by the PTAB20 and TTAB are appealable to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.2 1 These administrative
judgments stem from both ex parte and contested cases.22
15. See In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(highlighting that the PTAB must fully explain its judgment).
16. See generally Ryan J. Gatzemeyer, Are Patent Owners Given a Fair
Fight? Investigating the AIA Trial Practices, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 531 (2015)
(explaining the newly created proceedings and their surprising popularity).
17. See Jason Rantanen, Data on Federal Circuit Appeals and Decisions,
PATENTLY-O (June 2, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/06/circuit-appeals
-decisions.html.
18. See Gatzemeyer, supra note 16, at 561-62.
19. See Rantanen, supra note 17.
20. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board was formerly known as the Board of
Patent Appeals & Interferences. Its name was changed as part of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act of 2011, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011)
(AIA introduced AIA Trials and eliminated prospective interference
proceedings).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2012). Patent appeals may be taken in cases involving
ex parte examination, reexaminations, AIA trials, derivation proceedings, and
interferences. Id. Trademark appeals may stem from a registration,
interference, opposition, or cancellation proceeding. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1)
(2012). In certain cases, a party may choose instead to challenge PTO decisions
by filing a civil action in federal district court. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b); 35
U.S.C. § 145.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a).
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The statutes provide that on appeal the Federal Circuit "shall
review the decision from which the appeal is taken on the record
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office." 2 3 The
statutes then require that "[u]pon its determination the court shall
issue to the Director [of the Patent and Trademark Office] its
mandate and opinion, which shall be entered of record in the Patent
and Trademark Office and shall govern the further proceedings in
the case." 24  I suggest it is this statutory requirement-"shall
issue .. . its .. . opinion"-that requires the court to provide an
opinion explaining the bases for determination.
A. History of the Statutory Provisions Requiring a Written Opinion
The statutory provisions at issue reach back to at least the year
1893 and the creation of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. 25 In its enacting statute, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals was authorized to pass judgment on appeals from the
Commissioner of Patents. 26  The provision required "[t]hat the
opinion of the said court of appeals in every case shall be rendered
in writing, and shall be filed in such case as a part of the record
thereof." 2 7 In 1929, jurisdiction over these appeals shifted to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA").28 The CCPA
authorizing statute required that "[t]he opinion of the Court . .. in
every case on appeal from the decision of the Patent Office shall be
rendered in writing, and shall be filed in such case as part of the
record thereof, and a certified copy of said opinion shall be sent to
the Commissioner of Patents and shall be entered of record in the
Patent Office." 29 The statute was again rewritten with the Patent
Act of 1952.30 At that time, Congress added the language that the
CCPA's decisions "shall be confined to the points set forth in the
reasons for appeal."31 The revised 1952 statute no longer expressly
required a written opinion, but did require that "[u]pon its
determination the court shall return to the Commissioner a
certificate of its proceedings and decision, which shall be entered of
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4); 35 U.S.C. § 144.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4); 35 U.S.C. § 144.
25. Theodore Voorhees, The District of Columbia Courts: A Judicial
Anomaly, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 917, 925 (1980).
26. Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 9, 27 Stat. 434, 436. The Patent Act of
1836 provided for a "board of examiners" appointed by the Secretary of State
that has power to overturn decisions of the Patent Commissioner. Patent Act of
1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117. Nothing in that statute expressly required a
written opinion from the selected board, but only that each board member
should receive a sum not exceeding ten dollars. Id.
27. Act of Feb. 9, 1893 § 10.
28. Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475.
29. Id. § 3.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1952).
31. Id.
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record in the Patent Office and govern the further proceedings in the
case." 32 In 1962, the Lanham Act was also amended to require that
the CCPA's decisions in trademark appeals "be confined to the
points set forth in the reasons of appeal" and that a certification of
decision be provided to the Patent Office Commissioner that then be
entered of record. 33 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
was created in 1982 as the successor court of and replacement for
the CCPA and authority was shifted to the new appellate court. 3 4 In
1984 the statutes were amended again-this time reintroducing the
aforementioned opinion requirement that continues to be in effect.35
Unfortunately, legislative history explains neither the reasons
for the elimination of the opinion requirement in 1952 nor those for
its subsequent reintroduction in 1984. According to the
accompanying House Judiciary Committee report, the amendments
were associated with a streamlining of procedures-a "cost-saving
provision."36  However, those cost savings were expected to be
generated by elimination of the statutory requirement for certified
copies of papers and evidence being used in the appeal. 37 The
legislative history made no mention of the new opinion requirement
or why it was included in the revision.
The lack of legislative history for the 1984 opinion requirement
addition is at least partially explained by context. At the time of the
bill's passage, the Federal Circuit's standard operating procedure
was to write opinions in all cases-a practice that it had adopted
from its predecessor court, the CCPA, which appears to have
maintained that practice for the entirety of its existence. 38 Thus,
the longstanding status quo in 1984 was that all appeals from the
PTO received a written opinion explaining the judgment. As such, I
interpret the legislative requirement more as a codification of
practice and returning to statutory roots rather than as a "fix" or
change of expectations. 39
Although seemingly unique at the federal appellate level, the
requirement is not unique to American law. The Federal Rules of
32. Id.
33. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 12, 76 Stat. 769, 771-72.
34. Id.
35. Technical Amendments to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 414, 98 Stat 3335, 3362-63 (amending both the patent
and trademark statutes in parallel).
E 36. H.R. REP. No. 98-619, at 5 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5794, 5797.
37. Id.
38. See Matthew J. Dowd, Fed. Circ. Is Permitted To Use Rule 36 For
USPTO Appeals, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 2017, 12:29 PM), https://www.1aw360.com
/articles/898732/fed-circ-is-permitted-to-use-rule-36-for-uspto-appeals.
39. See Ted Sichelman, Patent Law Revisionism at the Supreme Court?, 45
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 307, 308 (2013) ("When Congress passes a statute codifying
judicial doctrine, the judiciary is expected to read that doctrine with fidelity.").
565
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Civil Procedure require a federal district court to "find the facts
specially and state its conclusions of law separately." 40 Similarly,
district court judges must "state in open court the reasons" for
imposing a particular criminal sentence. 41 A number of states have
also imposed requirements upon their appellate courts to expressly
justify their judgments. 42 In addition, a general principal of federal
administrative law requires written explanations of adverse
judgments.4 3 The Federal Circuit itself has repeatedly rejected
decisions from lower courts for failing to fully explain their
decisions. 44
B. History of the Federal Circuit's Local Rule Allowing Judgment
Without Opinion
Written opinions were uncommon in early English common
law.4 5 Although American appellate courts have largely kept to the
tradition of writing opinions explaining their judgment, no-opinion
judgments have also remained popular throughout the nation's
history.46 For instance, in his 1937 article, Affirmance Without
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012).
42. See ARIz. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2 ("The decisions of the court shall be in
writing and the grounds stated."); CAL. CONST. art VI, § 14 (stating Supreme
Court and Appellate Court must make determinations "in writing with reasons
stated"); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 15 (stating Supreme Court determinations must
be in "an opinion, in writing"); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 6 ("Decisions of the
supreme court . .. shall be in writing and shall contain a concise statement of
the facts and reasons for each decision and reasons for each denial of leave to
appeal."); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(C) ("The decisions in all cases in the Supreme
Court shall be reported, together with the reasons therefor."); WASH. CONST. art.
IV, § 2 ("In the determination of causes all decisions of the [supreme] court shall
be given in writing and the grounds of the decision shall be stated."); W. VA.
CONsT. art. VIII, § 4 (stating the Supreme Court shall file the reasons for its
decision in writing); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (requiring brief but complete
decisions from the court of appeals); Rene Lettow Lerner, International Pressure
to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001
B.Y.U. L. REV. 229, 287 (2001) ("Each of the arbitration regimes specified under
NAFTA requires thgt the award be in writing and the reasons stated.").
43. See In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that the PTAB must fully explain its judgment); Martin Shapiro, The
Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 184-87 (1992).
44. Cutsforth v. MotivePower, No. 2015-1316, 2016 WL 279984, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Jan. 22, 2016) ("Because the Board did not adequately describe its
reasoning for finding the claims obvious, we vacate and remand for further
proceedings."); In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The
agency tribunal must make findings of relevant facts, and present its reasoning
in sufficient detail that the court may conduct meaningful review of the agency
action."); see Dennis Crouch, Board Must Explain its Decisions, PATENTLY-O
(Jan. 22, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/01/federal-circuit-decisions
.html.
45. Marcus, supra note 1, at 213.
46. Id.
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Opinion, Philip Marcus found that most of the judgments issued by
the New York Court of Appeals (the highest New York state court)
in 1934 and 1935 were decided without opinion. 47 The United
States Supreme Court has also relied upon the practice through
summary affirmances4 8 and GVR mandates. 49
In 1982, in its very first issued decision, the Federal Circuit
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of its predecessor courts,
including the CCPA.50 That decision was facilitated by the fact that
the CCPA only issued precedential opinions when deciding merits
cases. As it began its process, the Federal Circuit also followed this
tradition by writing opinions in all cases.
The Federal Circuit's predecessor court, the CCPA, perhaps
came closest to reckoning with the requirement of a written opinion
in its 1944 Hamer v. White51 decision. 52 In Hamer, the court
affirmed the patent board's decision in an interference proceeding
between two sets of competing patent applicants. 53 Rather than
writing a complete opinion explaining the issues and its judgment,
the court decided to accept the Board's findings. 54 In doing so,
however, the 1946 panel's output differed greatly from contemporary
Rule 36 affirmances without opinion. Notably, the court wrote
several pages of text that identified and challenged particular
aspects of the Board's opinion as well as the parties' arguments.5 5
Hamer did include an interesting statement regarding the court's
duty of a written opinion when reversing:
The decisions of the board, of course, will be available to all
who may care to read it after our decision shall have been
published. Any written review of the evidence made by us
could be little more than a paraphrase of what the board said.
Were we reversing the decision of the board it would be
incumbent upon us to give a written review and point out the
47. Id. at 216; see also Lee Van der Voo, Unwritten Opinions Hard to Erase
at the Oregon Court of Appeals, INVESTIGATEWEST (Sept. 16, 2015)
http://invw.org/2015/09/16/unwritten-opinions-hard-to-erase-at-the-oregon
-court-of-appeals/ (stating that "more than half the cases reviewed by the state's
second-to-highest court end up unchanged, with no written explanation for why
the court didn't tinker with them").
48. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 433 n.18
(1983) (explaining the result of a summary affirmance).
49. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court's Controversial GVRs -
And an Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REv. 711, 712 (2009).
50. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982);
Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions As Precedent, 55
HASTINGs L.J. 1235, 1244 n.71 (2004).
51. 143 F.2d 987 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
52. Id. at 990.
53. Id. at 991.
54. Id. at 990.
55. Id. at 989-91.
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reasons for disagreement. Since we are affirming, no such
review is necessary.56
The opinion did not provide any citation for the source of this
full-review requirement. The statutory law would have been an
obvious source since, at the time, the statute required that "the
opinion of the Court .. . in every case on appeal from decision of the
Patent Office shall be rendered in writing."5 7 That same year, the
court in Kenyon v. Platt5 8 came to a parallel conclusion, writing that
"it would serve no useful purpose to here restate in detail the
attempts shown in appellees' voluminous record to prove reduction
to practice."5 9 However, as in Hamer, the Kenyon court provided a
substantive opinion on the merits even if it did not completely
restate the evidentiary conclusions of the Board. 60
By 1989, however, members of the court recognized the
increasing potential of a docket backlog and implemented local Rule
36 to allow for affirmances without opinion.6 1 In discussing the rule
change, then-Chief Judge Markey offered this new "third form of
disposition where it's not necessary to explain, even to the loser,
why he lost." 6 2 The Internal Operating Procedures ("IOPs") of the
Federal Circuit explain that "[t]he workload of the appellate courts
precludes preparation of precedential opinions in all cases" and that
"unnecessary .. . full opinions . .. impede the rendering of decisions
and the preparation of precedential opinions in cases which merit
that effort."63
Thus, the new rule allowing affirmances without opinion was
implemented by unilateral court action five years after Congress
amended the statute to require the same court to provide an opinion
in PTO cases. 64 Although any local rule "must be consistent
with .. . Acts of Congress,"65 the Federal Circuit appears to have-
up to now-given no consideration to whether its rule violates the
statute. Likewise, as noted by Federal Circuit Judge Evan Wallach
56. Id. at 990.
57. Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 3, 45 Stat. 1475, 1476.
58. 152 F.2d 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1946).
59. Id. at 1008.
60. Id. at 1008-11.
61. FED. CIR. R. 36; see Transcript of The Seventh Annual Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 128
F.R.D. 409, 420 (1989) [hereinafter Transcript]. The local rules had been
originally written the prior year, but the new Rule 36 was added by amendment
the following year. See id. at 418.
62. Transcript, supra note 61, at 420.
63. FED. CIR. I.O.P. 10 (the IOPs' explanation is written as a justification
for non-precedential opinions; it does not directly justify the need for the release
of judgments without opinions as opposed to non-precedential opinions).
64. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
65. FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1).
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in a recent article, Rule 36 decisions have only rarely been the
subject of academic literature.66
The court's rules limit Rule 36 judgments to cases where "an
opinion would have no precedential value" and at least one of the
following is true:
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed
from is based on findings that are not clearly erroneous; (b) the
evidence supporting the jury's verdict is sufficient; (c) the
record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or
judgment on the pleadings; (d) the decision of an
administrative agency warrants affirmance under the
standard of review in the statute authorizing the petition for
review; or (e) a judgment or decision has been entered without
an error of law.67
Of course, when issuing such a judgment, the court does not identify
sources of qualification. 68  A number of other circuit courts of
appeals have local rules that expressly allow for judgment without
opinion. 69
The Federal Circuit is not solely a patent court. Rather, the
court handles a wide variety of appeals in addition to those arising
from the PTO.70 These include appeals arising from the Court of
Federal Claims, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, various
boards of contract appeals, the United States Merit Systems
Protection Board, the United States International Trade
Commission, and the United States Court of International Trade.71
In addition, the Federal Circuit hears patent infringement cases
stemming from the various U.S. district courts.72 The statutes
requiring an opinion do not appear to apply to cases arising from
these non-PTO fora.
C. Recent Rise in No-Opinion Judgments of Patent and Trademark
Office Appeals to the Federal Circuit
Over the past few years, the number of PTO appeals to the
Federal Circuit has risen dramatically and, as you might expect, so
66. Evan J. Wallach & Jonathan J. Darrow, Federal Circuit Review of
USPTO Inter Partes Review Decisions, by the Numbers: How the ALA Has
Impacted the Caseload of the Federal Circuit, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 105, 113 (2016).
67. FED. CIR. R. 36.
68. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Rea, 528 F. App'x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
69. See 1ST CIR. R. 36(a); 4TH CIR. I.O.P. 36.3; 6TH CIR. R. 36; 10TH CIR. R.
36.1.
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has the percentage of Rule 36 judgments.73 For instance, Professor
Jason Rantanen calculated that in 2015 and the first five months of
2016 the Federal Circuit decided most PTO appeals via Rule 36
judgments.7 4 The rise in the absolute number of PTO appeals heard
by the Federal Circuit is largely driven by implementation of the
inter partes review procedure authorized by the AIA.75 Prior to
that, both PTO appeals to the Federal Circuit and the percentage of
Rule 36 judgments had been relatively stable for many years. 76
One might expect that Rule 36 judgments would be used in only
non-controversial, open-and-shut cases applying longstanding law.7 7
However, Peter Harter and Gene Quinn have identified many recent
Rule 36 judgments that focus on substantial and novel patent law.78
In an admittedly one-sided article, the pair writes, "[T]he Federal
Circuit is simply abnegating its duty [to provide uniform patent
doctrine] by refusing to speak on critical issues of patent eligibility
under when it has a duty to do so." 7 9
Although Harter and Quinn call for congressional action to fix
the problem, the pair did not consider the opinion requirement
73. See Rantanen, supra note 17; Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit Now
Receiving More Appeals Arising from the PTO than the District Courts,
PATENTLY-0 (Mar. 2, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/03/receiving
-appeals-district.html; see also HOWARD T. MARKEY, THE EIGHTH YEAR: REPORT
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 2-3 (1990);
Jennifer A. Tegfeldt, A Few Practical Considerations in Appeals Before the
Federal Circuit, 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 237, 248 (1993); Marynelle Wilson & Antigone
Peyton, 2011 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 61 AM. U. L. REV.
1151, 1154 (2012) ("[I]n 2010, the Federal Circuit affirmed thirty-three percent
of appeals of substantive trademark issues without opinion; in 2011, the court
affirmed forty percent without opinion."); Brief for Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n as
Amicus Curiae, CPC Int'l, Inc., v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., Nos. 94-1045,
94-1060 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 22, 1994), reprinted in 4 FED. CIR. B.J. 269, 273-74
(1994) [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (including statistics on the early years of Rule
36 practice).
74. Rantanen, supra note 17.
75. Wallach & Darrow, supra note 66, at 113 (referencing Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); section on inter
partes review codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012), amended by H.R.
6621, Pub. L. No. 112-274, 126 Stat. 2456 (2013)).
76. See MARKEY, supra note 73, at 2-3; Tegfeldt, supra note 73, at 248.
77. Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding
summary affirmance "is appropriate, inter alia, when the position of one party
is so clearly correct as a matter of law that no substantial question regarding
the outcome of the appeal exists").
78. Peter Harter & Gene Quinn, Rule 36: Unprecedented Abuse at the
Federal Circuit, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017
/01/12/rule-36-abuse-federal-circuit/id=76971/; Quinn, supra note 10 (citing a
dozen such cases).
79. Id. In this context Harter and Quinn argue that the court is violating
its own rule that limits Rule 36 judgments to cases where the resulting "opinion
would have no precedential value." Id.
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already found in the statute.8 0 I argue here that Congress has
already acted and already requires an opinion in these cases.
II. THE MOST DEFENSIBLE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTES IS THAT
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT Is REQUIRED TO ISSUE AN OPINION WHEN
DETERMINING THE OUTCOME OF APPEALS FROM THE PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE
The statutes state that the Federal Circuit "shall issue ... its
mandate and opinion" when deciding appeals from the PTO.81 The
statutes are so straightforward that it appears almost laughable to
argue that no opinion is required. However, as noted above, the
court's standard operating procedures have been seemingly in
violation of the statutes for more than a quarter century. 82 That
longstanding practice thus requires a more complete interpretation
of the statute and consideration of whether the court is in violation.
In doing this analysis, however, there is little precedential backdrop
because it appears that the court has entirely ignored the statutes.
Rather than addressing the potential conflict between the law and
its procedures, the court has instead taken no steps to expressly
consider whether its no-opinion judgments violate the law. 83 This
section briefly steps through statutory construction of the brief
statute and its key words: "its . . . opinion."84
Statutory construction begins with the words of the statute and
their plain meaning.8 5 According to the Federal Circuit, "When a
statute is at issue, we begin with the statutory language." 86 When
clear, courts presumptively follow a statute's semantic meaning.87
80. Id.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2012).
82. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
83. David F. Johnson, 'You Can't Handle the Truth!" -Appellate Courts'
Authority to Dispose Of Cases Without Written Opinions, 22 APP. ADvoc. 419,
419 (2010) (failing to recognize the existence of the particular statute for patent
and trademark cases). At least one petitioner challenged the Federal Circuit's
Rule 36 practice as "contrary to appropriate appellate judicial procedure." See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Schoonover v. Wild Injun Prod., 56 F.3d 80
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-410); see also Petition for Rehearing at 7-9, Biopolymer
Eng'g, Inc. v. Immunocorp, 390 F. App'x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2010-1096),
order vacated on rehg, 397 F. App'x 662 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (challenging Rule 36
judgment for failing to fit within the bounds of the rule itself).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4); 35 U.S.C. § 144.
85. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 621 (1990) (discussing the debate over what level preference should be
given to a text's plain meaning).
86. McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) (stating that statutory interpretation begins
"with the language of the statute").
87. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991) (indicating a 'strong
presumption' that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional
intent"); Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 64 (1953) ("It is
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"If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the inquiry
ends with the plain meaning." 88 That plain semantic meaning is
derived from text as well as the statutory structure.8 9
In our situation, the primary statutory statement at issue is
found in 35 U.S.C. § 144. That section is titled "Decision on appeal"
and is housed within Chapter 13 of Title 35 of the United States
Code. 90 The entire chapter focuses on court challenges of PTO
decisions.9 1  Section 144 is the only provision that discusses the
decision on appeal. The provision states in full:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the
record before the Patent and Trademark Office. Upon its
determination the court shall issue to the Director its mandate
and opinion, which shall be entered of record in the Patent and
Trademark Office and shall govern the further proceedings in
the case. 92
The trademark statute is closely parallel. The provision in
question is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4). Section 1071 is
generally titled "Appeal to courts" and subsection (a)(4) is the only
portion that directly relates to the court's decision on appeal.93 The
subpart states in full:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall review the decision from which the appeal is taken on the
record before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Upon its determination the court shall issue its mandate and
opinion to the Director, which shall be entered of record in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office and shall govern
the further proceedings in the case. However, no final
judgment shall be entered in favor of an applicant under
section 1051(b) of this title before the mark is registered, if
such applicant cannot prevail without establishing
constructive use pursuant to section 1057(c) of this title.9 4
not for us then to try to avoid the conclusion that Congress did not mean what it
said."); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33 (1895) ("It is not
only the safer course to adhere to the words of a statute, construed in their
ordinary import, instead of entering into any inquiry as to the supposed
intention of Congress, but it is the imperative duty of the court to do so.").
88. Ardestani, 511 F.3d at 1356.
89. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001); Norfolk Dredging Co.
v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
90. 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2012).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) (2012).
94. Id.
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The textual focus for this Article is the requirement in both
statutes that "the court shall issue . . . its . . . opinion." I deconstruct
the analysis here to primarily focus on two questions: (1) does a Rule
36 judgment without opinion qualify as an "opinion" under the
statute; and (2) does the statute actually require an opinion?
A. An Opinion is an Explanation, Not Simply the Judgment
'AFFIRMED"
Black's Law Dictionary defines "opinion" as you might expect:
"A court's written statement explaining its decision in a given case,
[usually] including the statement of facts, points of law, rationale,
and dicta. Also termed judicial opinion."95 An opinion is distinct
from a judgment (or decision) in that the former requires
explanation while the latter does not.96 The Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure complement this distinction-noting the clerk
must enter a judgment both in cases with an opinion as well as in
cases where "judgment is rendered without an opinion, as the court
instructs."97
In his article titled What's An Opinion For?, Professor James B.
White explains that that the opinion provides much more than
simply the case's outcome:
For in every case the court is saying not only, "This is the right
outcome for this case," but also, "This is the right way to think
and talk about this case, and others like it." The opinion in
this way gives authority to its own modes of thought and
expression, to its own intellectual and literary forms. 98
Although perhaps lofty in its writing, Professor White's point
parallels that of the dictionary-that a judicial opinion must be
more than simply the one word "AFFIRMED."
Some readers convinced by my argument that the statute
requires an opinion may attempt to foxtrot around any dramatic
impact of that conclusion by arguing that the court's Rule 36
judgments are actually offering an opinion. To be fair, the
judgments do offer a one-word statement, "AFFIRMED." And,
although miniscule and de minimus in its explanatory value, its
explanatory value is probably greater than nothing. But "more than
nothing" does not equate to an opinion, and offering a one-word
judgment-what the court is doing here-is separate and distinct
from offering an opinion. Furthermore, this argument appears
95. Opinion, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
96. Judgment, BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining broadly
"judgment" as "[a] court's final determination of the rights and obligations of
the parties in a case").
97. FED. R. App. P. 36.
98. James Boyd White, What's an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363,
1366-67 (1995).
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foreclosed by multiple prior statements in the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, local rules, opinions, and statements by the
court that all directly and unequivocally distinguish between
judgments accompanied by an opinion and those without opinion.99
In describing its own procedures, the Federal Circuit writes,
"The court's decisions on the merits of all cases submitted after oral
argument or on the briefs, other than those disposed of under Rule
36, shall be explained in an accompanying precedential or
nonprecedential opinion."10 0
In other words, the court states that opinions explain decisions,
and its Rule 36 judgments are not opinions. Perhaps the clearest
precedential statements come from the court's 2012 and 2013
decisions of Rates Technology, Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc.101 and
TecSec, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp.102 In both
cases, the court held that no information can be gleaned from a Rule
36 judgment other than affirmance of the lower court's judgment. 103
In particular, the court made clear that a Rule 36 judgment should
not be seen as affirming the reasoning of the lower court. 104
In Rates Technology, the plaintiffs attorney, James Hicks,
appealed the trial court's discovery sanctions. 105 In the briefing,
Hicks cited to a prior Rates Technology case where his conduct had
been unsuccessfully challenged. 106 In the prior case, the district
court had sided with Hicks (refusing to award sanctions) and the
decision was then affirmed by the Federal Circuit on appeal in a
Rule 36 judgment without an opinion. 107 Rebuking Hicks, the
Federal Circuit wrote:
Rule 36 allows us to "enter a judgment of affirmance without
opinion" under certain circumstances. Since there is no
opinion, a Rule 36 judgment simply confirms that the trial
court entered the correct judgment. It does not endorse or
reject any specific part of the trial court's reasoning. In
addition, a judgment entered under Rule 36 has no
99. Wallach & Darrow, supra note 66, at 113 (referring to Rule 36 opinions
as "affirmances without opinion").
100. FED. Cm. I.O.P. 9.
101. 688 F.3d 742 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
102. 731 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
103. Rates Tech., 688 F.3d at 750; TecSec, 731 F.3d at 1342.
104. Id.
105. See Rates Tech., 688 F.3d at 744-45.
106. Appellant Reply Brief at 11, Rates Tech., Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom,
Inc., 688 F.3d 742 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2011-1384).
107. Rates Tech., Inc. v. Tele-Flex Sys., Inc., No. 00-1184, 2000 WL 1807411,
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2000).
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precedential value and cannot establish "applicable Federal
Circuit law."108
The next year, in TecSec, the court faced a situation where it
had previously affirmed a district court judgment of non-
infringement via a Rule 36 judgment without opinion. 109 Later,
TecSec appealed the same construction claim that had been
previously appealed, but now involving a different party as an
accused infringer.110 In the second appeal, the Federal Circuit found
no preclusion-either from the mandate rule or from the doctrines of
issue preclusion and law of the case because the lower court decision
had been granted on two independent alternate bases and therefore
"it [was] impossible to glean which issues this court decided when
we issued the Rule 36 judgment."1 In other words, the TecSec
court found that a Rule 36 judgment does not bar relitigating the
identical issues appealed unless the issues were necessary for the
affirmance. 112 Since a Rule 36 judgment could be based upon a
purely procedural matter raised sua sponte and sub silento by the
appellate court, it is not clear the unstated reasons for such a
judgment could ever truly be isolated to this degree. The Supreme
Court has similarly explained that its summary dispositions
"[affirm] only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be
read into [its] action than was essential to sustain that
judgment."1 1 3 The analysis of these cases may act as a detour, but I
suggest that it offers substantial contour and backing to the simple
claim that a Rule 36 judgment is not an opinion.
A substantial amount of academic literature focuses on the
distinction between published and unpublished opinions, including
some questions of whether unpublished opinions should even count
as opinions. 114 The literature does not include a discussion of no-
opinion judgments, but those judgments go well beyond the prior
perceived line of non-publication.1 15
108. Rates Tech., 688 F.3d at 750; see also U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon,
Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Board of
Supervisors, 165 N.W. 390, 390 (Iowa 1917) (indicating no inference of approval
for purpose of stare decisis from affirmance without opinion).
109. See TecSec, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 466 Fed. App'x. 882 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).




113. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-
83 (1979).
114. Gilbert S. Merritt, The Decision Making Process in Federal Courts of
Appeals, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385, 1385 (1990) (raising "the definitional problem of
what is an opinion").
115. Id.
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Looking at its structure, the statute also calls for issuance of a
mandate that appears to be separate and distinct from the
opinions.16 The mandate is the actual order from the appellate
court to the lower body.1 17 A mandate in the federal courts is a term
of art defined largely by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.118
These rules spell out that a "formal" mandate may be issued, but
otherwise includes "a certified copy of the judgment, a copy of the
court's opinion, if any, and any direction about costs."119 Note here
that the rules again make a distinction between the judgment and
the opinion and recognize that an appellate court may issue a
judgment without opinion.1 20 That distinction matches with Rule
36, which recognizes that judgments may be "rendered without an
opinion, as the court instructs." 121
B. The Statute Requires a Written Opinion
I suggest that the best interpretation of the statutory phrase
"the court shall issue . .. its . . . opinion" requires issuance of an
opinion. However, a conceivable interpretation of the statute would
require issuance of the opinion only if such an opinion exists-
rendering the requirement merely an illusory request. If the
Federal Circuit's opinion does not exist, then "its opinion" is simply
a nullity. This end-run interpretation somewhat parallels the
Federal Circuit's interpretation of the "best mode" requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112(a). Section 112(a) states that the inventor "shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor." 122  When
interpreting the statute, the court has repeatedly held that the best
mode need only be submitted when the inventor actually "had a best
mode of practicing the claimed invention."123  As interpreted,§ 112(a) does not require that the inventor actually take any steps to
identify a best mode and the provision simply does not impact
inventors who never identify the best mode of their invention.1 24
Although linguistically appealing, the best mode analogy fails
for several reasons, beginning with the comparative language of the
statutes. Section 112(a) includes the express caveat of best mode
"contemplated by the inventor," and it is that caveat that forms the
linguistic hook for limiting the doctrine.1 25  The distinction is
116. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
117. Mandate, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("1. An order from
an appellate court directing a lower court to take a specified action.").
118. FED. R. APP. P. 41.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. FED. R. APP. P. 36.
122. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
123. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927-28, (Fed. Cir.
1990).
124. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
125. Id.
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revealed by comparing the best mode statutory language with
another requirement of § 112(a)-that "the specification shall
contain a written description of the invention."1 26 The written
description provision lacks the "contemplated by the inventor"
caveat and consequently is interpreted as a requirement that must
be metl 27-not one excused by a plea that the inventor did not have
a written description on hand. Section 112(b) of the Patent Act
includes a similar requirement that the patent application include
claims that cover "the subject matter which the inventor . . . regards
as the invention."1 28 As with the written description requirement,
this requirement will not be excused by the inventor's lack of
understanding of what he or she "regards as the invention."1 29 For a
patentee, providing the written description is part of the quid pro
quo exchange for receiving patent rights.1 30 In the same way,
forming a reasoned decision is the role of every appellate court, and
the statute simply requires that those reasons be written and
released.
Reaching a judgment in each merits case is both an inherent
duty of the appellate court and a statutory requirement, and that
judgment requires the court to at least form a reasoned opinion that
justifies the outcome. In other words, the court must make its
judgment based upon the law at hand applied to the facts
presented.131 Even when issuing a judgment without releasing an
opinion, the court will have formed reasons for its judgment that are
at least self-satisfyingly sufficient. Anything less would be a
reversible arbitrary judgment and likely a violation of the due
process rights of the parties.1 32
The statutory requirement of issuing "its . . . opinion" is not an
illusory request that can be avoided by simply not writing an
opinion. Rather, the statute requires a transformation of the court's
internal decision justifications into a document that becomes part of
the record of the case as it returns to the PTO.
Although the actual inner-workings of the appellate courts are
often shrouded, the appellate panels do create and exchange
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
129. Id.
130. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
131. Amicus Brief, supra note 73, at 273 ("A panel that affirms a district
court decision under Rule 36 certainly has some reasons for doing so. Those
reasons should ordinarily be available to the parties and to the public to
demonstrate that issues have been considered and that there is a sound basis
for the court's decision.").
132. See Furman v. United States, 720 F.2d 263, 264 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
that a party has no constitutional right to appeal from a lower court opinion);
Chase v. Coe, 122 F.2d 198, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (stating that such a right likely
does exist for an agency action denying or canceling patent rights).
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informal opinions-either oral or written-of the cases that
eventually lead to the Rule 36 judgments. 133 The court's IOPs
require that the panel "hold at least one conference" to discuss and
decide the outcome. 134 And a panel's "election to utilize a Rule 36
judgment shall be unanimous among the judges of a panel." 135 To
wit, in a recent discussion of Rule 36 judgments, Federal Circuit
Judge Reyna reportedly indicated that "when a Rule 36 affirmance
is delivered the court has done 90% of the work" needed for a
written opinion.136 The court wrote as much in its 1997 U.S.
Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.137 decision: "Appeals whose
judgments are entered under Rule 36 receive the full consideration
of the court, and are no less carefully decided than the cases in
which we issue full opinions."138
There may be occasions where an appellate panel can reach
judgment without agreement upon the reasons for judgment. The
Supreme Court has recognized in the non-patent context that
''sometimes the members of the court issuing an unexplained order
will not themselves have agreed upon its rationale, so that the basis
of the decision is not merely undiscoverable but nonexistent." 13 9 Of
course, this unique situation will not explain the hundreds of no-
opinion judgments issued of late, nor does it face the particular
statutory requirement at issue here.
Finally, it makes sense to note that the full text of the statutes
requires the court to issue both "its mandate and opinion." 140 It
would be absurd to interpret this provision as requiring neither a
mandate nor an opinion because without either, the case is never
decided. 141
C. The Purposes of the Provision Support a Conclusion That the
Provision Requires a Written Opinion
In addition to requiring the court to issue an opinion, the
statutes at issue here also provide that the opinion "shall be entered
of record in the Patent and Trademark Office and shall govern the
further proceedings in the case." 14 2 This additional requirement
reflects the longstanding recognition of the public nature of patent
133. FED. Cm. I.O.P. 9.
134. FED. CIR. I.O.P. 8.
135. FED. Cm. I.O.P. 10.
136. Harter & Quinn, supra note 78.
137. 103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
138. Id. at 1556.
139. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2012).
141. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387,
2388 (2003) (interpreting statutes to avoid absurd results).
142. 35 U.S.C. § 144.
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rights. 14 3  Even more than other property rights, information
regarding a patent's scope and ownership have long been available
to the public. 14 4 Patent rights are effectively use and alienation
limits on items otherwise under the absolute control of members of
the public. 145 Although a company may own its own copper and
steel, patent rights held by others will limit what machines can be
built from those raw materials. 146 In his 2007 public notice article,
Professor Michael Risch explains:
One of the primary functions of a patent is to provide public
notice about the claimed invention. This goal has been a
primary rationale underlying patent jurisprudence for at least
150 years .... The public should not be deprived of rights
supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what it is
that limits these rights. 147
In Lear v. Adkins,148 the Supreme Court explained "the strong
federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public
domain." 149  The scope of those rights is found in the patent
documents, including patent application file histories. 150 Of course,
patent documents are now more complex than ever. A single
invention is ordinarily reflected in a set of differentiated claims,
regularly divided into multiple patent applications filed in the same
or different global patent offices, forming a patent family. 15 1
Further, multiple families of patents may be owned by the same
company and, although not formally related, may substantially
143. Ron Katznelson, Can the Supreme Court's Erosion of Patent Rights be
Reversed?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/03/02
/supreme-courts-erosion-patent-rights-reversed/id=78992/.
144. Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 179, 182 (2007).
145. In re Nuitjen, 500 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
146. Id.
147. Risch, supra note 144, at 187.
148. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
149. Id. at 674.
150. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 727, 732 (2002) (describing, inter alia, the prosecution history
documents as important public notice elements); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
F.3d 1303, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (considering "the indisputable
public records consisting of the claims, the specification and the prosecution
history" best serves "the public notice function of patents"); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 789 (2011)
(prosecution history is "in the public domain"); Sherkow, supra note 14
(discussing the "public nature of most patent disputes"); Whitney, supra note 14
("Public notice is of paramount importance for providing certainty and
predictability as to the scope of patent protection.").
151. Jonathan H. Ashtor, Opening Pandora's Box: Analyzing the Complexity
of U.S. Patent Litigation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 217, 242 (2016).
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overlap in coverage. 152  Although the Federal Circuit sets
precedential authority over all federal district courts (in patent
matters), the PTO does not have that authority.153 The collective
result of this is that the Federal Circuit's judicial reasoning-even
when affirming a PTO determination cancelling one or more patent
claims-will likely be highly relevant to later cases involving the
same or closely related inventions either in the United States or
abroad. The statute recognizes this by requiring the opinion be
issued and placed in the publicly available patent file. 1 54
The record appears unquestionable now that "Congress gave the
Federal Circuit a clear mandate to bring uniformity" and expertise
to patent law. 155 The problem, of course, is that the substantial
number of no-opinion judgments leaves the community and decision-
makers without substantial guidance. A recent example involves
the law of patent eligibility, which has been upended in recent years
by a series of Supreme Court decisions. 156 However, jurisprudence
in this area is following an example-based approach entirely,
meaning that each incremental decision offers important insight
into the scope of patent rights available. The benefit of expertise
and uniformity here is not simply to provide insight to other judicial
bodies. Rather, the vast majority of patents are never litigated but
are used as part of a rights-transfer, either in a license, outright
sale, or as collateral. 15 7 Another important example involves the
AIA, which has been seen as the most substantial modification of
U.S. patent law since 1952.158 Although the new law raises a large
number of both substantive and procedural issues, most of the
152. See, e.g., id. at 219 (highlighting the complexity of patent litigation,
including impact of PTO AIA Trials).
153. Id.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2012).
155. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As a Federal Court, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1791, 1798 (2013). See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 838 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (describing the Federal Circuit as a
"specialized court that was created, in part, to promote uniformity");
Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (emphasizing "Congress' intent to remove non-uniformity in the
patent law"); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc) (citing the court's "role in providing national uniformity"); H.R.
REP. No. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981); S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5-6 (1981); Christopher
A. Cotropia, 'Arising Under" Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 253, 256 (2003) ("The very uniformity Congress
attempted to introduce through its creation of the Federal Circuit may become
undone by the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1295(a)(1) and § 1338(a).").
156. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352
(2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1293 (2012); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its
Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2015).
157. Ashtor, supra note 151, at 222.
158. Dreyfuss, supra note 156 at 235.
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appeals to the Federal Circuit have been decided without opinion. 159
The court's failure to provide guidance in these areas of the law
creates direct uncertainty in these areas. 60
D. Congress Has Power to Require the Writing of an Opinion
A hallmark of the American constitutional structure is the
separation-of-powers between the three primary branches of
government. This system of checks and balances is not, however,
structured so that each branch operates independently without
being controlled by the others. 16 1 Rather, the structure is that each
branch has substantial control over the others. 162
Although major separation-of-powers issues continue to be
debated, those generally occur at the level of the highest court.1 63 It
appears certain that Congress holds the original power granted by
the Constitution to set the federal rules of civil and appellate
procedure for "[t]ribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."1 64 It is
159. Id. at 241.
160. Amicus Brief, supra note 73, at 271 ("A Rule 36 affirmance of a decision
involving a controversial legal issue provides little guidance to patent owners,
or to the business community, and leaves the parties with little basis to
challenge the correctness of any decision either factually or legally."); Harter &
Quinn, supra note 78; see also Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial
Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DuKE L.J. 1, 2 (2016). Some
commentators have drawn a link between administrative agency action and
that of the Federal Circuit jurisprudence-especially in its review of PTO
action. See Gugliuzza, supra note 155, at 1823 ("The court [at times] acts not as
an appellate court, reviewing the decision of an inferior tribunal, but as an
agency administrator, dictating the issues the PTO must consider."); Sapna
Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 269-74 (2013); Ryan
Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76
Mo. L. REV. 733, 744-49 (2011) (analogizing the Federal Circuit's en banc
process to administrative rule making). This analogy only works, however, to
the extent that the court issues instructive opinions. "Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the duty to give reasons is a function of due
process in the administrative context." Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have
Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 483, 529 (2015). Finally, a number of researchers have found that judges
fail to follow the requisite guidelines for when to publish opinions. Stephen J.
Choi et al., What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications,
Citations, and Reversals, 27 J.L. & EcoN. ORG. 1, 7 (2011) (pointing out that
despite the existence of guidelines directing judges when to publish opinions,
research shows that judges fail to follow them); see also Donald R. Songer et al.,
Nonpublication in the United States District Courts: Official Criteria Versus
Inferences from Appellate Review, 50 J. POL. 206, 207 (1988).
161. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1; U.S. CoNsT. art. II § 1; U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
162. See sources cited supra note 161.
163. See sources cited supra note 161.
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Though much of the congressional
authority was delegated to the courts through the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1964) (recognizing congressional
authority); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1097-98 (1982).
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now generally agreed that the power to make rules for lower federal
courts has been delegated to the Supreme Court by Congress, and
that Congress may withdraw or modify that power. 165
Professor Robert J. Pushaw explains that an understanding of
this framework dates at least to Chief Justice Marshall's decision in
Wayman v. Southard:166
Chief Justice Marshall expressed "no doubt whatever" about
Congress's Article I power to make procedural rules that it
deemed "necessary and proper" to enable federal courts to
fulfill their Article III functions, such as rendering judgments.
Indeed, Congress had a "duty" to "expressly and directly
provide" either a complete procedural code or the "great
outlines" of one, as it had done in the Process Act by
instructing federal judges to follow state practice circa 1789.167
The bottom line here is that Congress certainly has power to enact
rules of civil procedure, including its requirement here that an




The first and most obvious next step is that the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit should immediately stop issuing
Rule 36 judgments without opinion in appeals stemming from PTO
actions. Although substantial harm has already occurred through
what appears to be an unrecognized error, the gap can be
immediately filled by an internal unilateral action of the court.
Barring action by the court as a whole to modify its IOPs, each
appellate judge is empowered to at least block the use of Rule 36
judgments in their cases since the court's rules require unanimous
agreement of the panel judges. 168
165. Adam Behar, The Misuse of Inherent Powers When Imposing Sanctions
for Discovery Abuse: The Exclusivity of Rule 37, 9 CARDoZo L. REV. 1779, 1799-
1800 (1988) ("The Federal Rules are an exercise of Congress' legislative
power.").
166. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
167. Henry P. Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial
System 1922-1947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 505 (1962, 1963) ("Among some judges and
legal scholars the opinion was held that determining the rules of courts was
solely a judicial function and that the legislative branch had no right to touch
it . ... But the entire course of legislation concerning the federal courts from
the beginning of the federal government was against the theory."); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOwA L. REV. 735, 752 (2001).
168. FED. CIR. I.O.P. 9.5.
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Although a full analysis of standing is outside of the scope of
this Article, it appears clear that a party who has lost on Rule 36
certainly would have a right to request a panel rehearing or
rehearing en banc, or to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, so long as the timeline has not expired. 169 In the same
way that the appellate court rejects lower court decisions that fail to
comply with the explanatory requirements of Rule 52(a), 170 the
Supreme Court (or en banc Federal Circuit) could rebuke a panel
that failed comply with the opinion requirement of the Patent and
Trademark Acts. 171 The court, however, may well force a petitioner
to also show that the no-opinion error is not simply harmless error.
Although all of the members of the court have been on Rule 36
panels, the court has never considered the extent to which the
Patent and Trademark Acts contravene those judgments without
opinion. Thus, an ordinary panel of three judges will be fully
authorized to rule on the question without upsetting prior
precedent. Of course, there are several hundred Rule 36 decisions
from recent years that are now likely too ancient to revive.
Although I do not prefer this approach, we might recognize here
that the opinion requirement does not call for a substantial or
lengthy opinion. It would likely be sufficient for the court to include
a less-than comprehensive opinion, such as affirmed based upon
"the doctrine of res ipse loquitur," "affirmed upon authority of [prior
precedential case]," or "affirmed upon opinion below." 172
B. Should Congress Step In to Change the Law?
An important question in the background is whether Congress
should step in to change the law, relieving the court of its burden of
writing opinions in all PTO appeals. In my view, the answer to that
question is clearly "no." There is no general problem with issuing
opinions on the merits. The primary concern will be docketing and
potential backlog, and I am confident that the court will take
measures to ensure efficient adjudication while conforming to the
law. 173 Rule 36 judgments also offer the potential of providing quick
justice-"an immediate answer to the parties on appeal" in a way
that may be advantageous. 1 7 4 However, the court has historically
169. FED. CIR. I.O.P. 12.1.
170. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2012).
172. Marcus, supra note 1, at 217.
173. The Federal Circuit's docket is greatly simplified as compared to other
appellate courts because of the lack of a criminal law docket. But see Taylor v.
McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972) (expressing concern over lower court
dockets).
174. Tegfeldt, supra note 73, at 248 ("Unlike published and non-precedential
opinions, a Rule 36 case is not circulated to the full court before issuance. This
permits parties to receive a decision, in some cases, in very short order after the
oral hearing. For example, in the case of Upjohn Co. v. Medtron Laboratories,
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been willing to hear emergency motions for expedited hearing when
such a case arises. 175 In this situation, Congress should not step in
to rescue the court from writing opinions unless the need is actually
shown. Another justification for the no-opinion approach is that it
allows for slower development of the precedential edifice. Many
decision-makers gather significant input from a variety of sources
prior to finally deciding upon a course of action. A difficulty of the
appellate court precedential system is that a decision must be made
in the first case addressing an issue-perhaps before considering
important ramifications. 176 If that decision is precedential, then it
builds an edifice difficult to later tear down. Although this tale has
some interesting features-perhaps for a separate article-it does
not fit the storyline for no-opinion judgments because those
decisions are supposed to be limited to only opinions that "would
have no precedential value."1 77
CONCLUSION
In many ways, the Federal Circuit is facing a crisis of public
confidence based largely upon external changes to the legal
landscape but compounded by the court's masked jurisprudence-
hidden in the large number of summary affirmances. "Justice must
not only be done, it must appear to be done." 178 Opinions provide a
major source of legitimacy for the court. 179 Hidden decisions create
the risk of either sloppy or intentionally misguided actions as well
as later inconsistent rulings on the same set of facts.180
Furthermore, in the patent context, the public demands-and is
entitled to-a decision that both settles the law at hand and also
declares the facts in a way that becomes part of the case file and
that will guide later courts in interpreting the patent family. I have
so much respect for the members of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. I hope they will use this opportunity to take the
next step in the right direction.
Inc., No. 93-1137 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 1993), the court heard argument on August
5 and issued its order two working days later.").
175. Id. at 252.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited
Publication in the United States Court of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 573, 603 (1981).
179. Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial
Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1285 (2008).
180. Nathan Dodell, On Wanting to Know Why, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 465, 466
(1992).
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